July 9, 2002

Good Morning. I would like to thank the Chairman, Senator Biden for convening the first of several hearings on the important topic of nuclear threat reduction and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. It is my pleasure to be here today, and I would like to welcome Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Committee and thank him as well for coming here today to give us his testimony on an issue that is both compelling and of vital importance.

Mr. Chairman, especially in light of the tragic events of September 11, the problems and challenges associated with national security occupy our thoughts more than ever. As you know, included in these debates, the issues of missile alert status and discussions of nuclear non-proliferation and strategic arms reduction have been frequently discussed in Congress. It is a constant challenge to balance the legitimate security needs of the United States against the risks inherent in maintaining a substantial nuclear stockpile. Indeed, many are rightly and especially troubled at the state of the Russian arsenal. Underfunded and poorly maintained, the chances for mistakes and potential catastrophe increase with neglect and lack of proper upkeep. There are also legitimate concerns that a rogue state may acquire a nuclear weapon, as well as concern over the longstanding nuclear tensions that already exist between certain nations, as exemplified by the constant conflict between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region.

Given these many insecurities, I am encouraged by the recent treaty signed by Presidents Bush and Putin on May 24, 2002, and grateful for the progress these two leaders have made thus far. I believe strongly that the various provisions included in this treaty will serve as a guide and a framework toward future arms reduction negotiations. Indeed, although the Treaty of Moscow is a good first step, and an auspicious sign of cooperation between our two countries, we must not sit idle now. Instead, let us redouble our efforts and move from talk of reduction to dismantlement.

In the meantime, the United States can take the lead on this treaty and push for full compliance and implementation in a timely manner, perhaps even before the 2012 deadline. We can further lead by example on this treaty through the good faith measure of full transparency as we proceed with determining the number and precise type of warheads to be removed. These confidence-building measures may encourage Russia to swifter compliance with the treaty and will hopefully help build towards a transparency agreement that will eventually apply to warhead dismantlement and elimination as well. I believe transparency is important as we seek to coordinate our efforts on treaty implementation because the sheer volume of nuclear material being discussed here is quite extraordinary. At present, Russia has 20,000 assembled nuclear weapons, with the capability to build three times that many. The treaty may be sound, and it may be a solid first step, but the issue of comprehensive threat reduction cannot be resolved through the removal of a couple of thousand warheads. Not only must we go further, but we need to address how to safeguard nuclear materials once they are no longer in operational deployment or have been dismantled.

And so, I support President Bush's progress on this issue, and the SORT Treaty itself, but I also call on the Bush Administration and my colleagues in the Senate to push for further action on this issue even as we enter into compliance with the Treaty of Moscow.

With that, I yield, and I look forward to Secretary Powell's testimony.

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